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International organisations are promoting primary
health care (PHC) as the main strategy for tackling
health problems around the world [WHO/UNICEF
1978; IBRD 1980], and many developing countries
have adopted health care policies in line with that
strategy. The results, however, have not always
matched the optimistic forecasts expressed in
international documents [Djukanovic and Mach
1975]. A recent study by the UNICEF/WHO joint
committee on health policy [1981] identified obstacles
which have hindered the full implementation of PHC
in several countries. Such obstacles are similar to those
which undermine the success of redistributive policies
in general throughout the Third World.
According to the PHC approach, the promotion of
health should be based on action in the socioeconomic
sphere as well as in the health care sector itself. The
former aims to counteract the causes of ill health and
to make the development process itself more likely to
contribute to improving people's health. The latter
tries to make the existing health services more
equitable and effective in relation to the needs of the
population. Although all this sounds eminently
reasonable in theory, PHC turns out to be problematic
in practice, because many of the policies may not be
viable in political terms. It maybe impossible for PHC
to be adopted realistically as an immediate target, so
that it comes to be seen as only a possible - almost
utopian - outcome of political processes which must
be worked through over the long term.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the Brazilian
experience with respect to PHC in the recent past. As
will be seen, it is an experience characterised by little
success, and on top of this it has focused almost
exclusively on the health care aspects of PHC. Despite
these limitations, the case of Brazil is worth discussing,
not only within the country in the context of planning
future national strategies, but also as a contribution to
the international debate on the subject. Before
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explaining the sequence of PHC events in the country,
a brief account is given of the current health and health
care situation. The paper then describes a new PHC
programme that the government has recently failed to
adopt. Finally, the main lessons to be learnt from this
failure are discussed to provide a basis for future
attempts to promote alternative policies in the health
sector.
The Health Problems and their Socioeconomic
Determinants2
The Brazilian population has experienced a remark-
able improvement in its health status: by 1980, life
expectancy at birth was 61.3 years for men and 65.5
years for women, a 50 per cent increase in comparison
with 1940. Nevertheless, countries like Argentina,
Chile, or Venezuela, appear to be enjoying better
health than Brazil, although they have reached only
comparable stages of socioeconomic development. In
addition, within the country, inequalities in mortality
and morbidity rates by social class or region have
widened in recent years. There has also been a rising
incidence of chronic diseases, whose control demands
increasing quantities of health care resources. At the
same time, other causes of illness and death - notably
infectious diseases - still persist at high levels,
although they could be prevented by using the
resources available in the country.
Such an epidemiological situation is related closely to
the socioeconomic changes that have been taking
place in Brazil since the 1950s. The share of agriculture
in the gross domestic product (GDP) has halved to 10
per cent, while that of industry has increased from 25
to 37 per cent. There has been a corresponding massive
shift of the economically active population from the
rural to the urban areas. If the current trends persist,
about 80 per cent of the population (some 160-170 mn
people) will be living in towns larger than 10,000 by the
end of the century, and about 50 per cent will be
concentrated in 10 metropolitan regions.
Data presented in this section and the following one are extracted
from Acordo MS-MEC-MPAS/OPS [l982J.
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The growth of employment in the cities, however, is
lagging behind the urbanisation rate and this has
produced vast masses of unemployed people earning
their subsistence from the 'black' economy. The rural
population is actually declining in absolute terms, and
large sections of the peasantry have been turned into a
rural proletariat, whose aspirations and demands are
influenced by those prevailing in the cities. Urbani-
sation is also said to be responsible for a declining
fertility rate and a slower demographic growth in
Brazil, which mean that the population is gradually
getting older in composition. This trend, together with
the urban concentration, pollution, and a prevailing
working environment which is often detrimental to
health, is helping to produce a rising incidence of
chronic and degenerative diseases, accidents, and
violent deaths.
Despite the extraordinary economic growth of the last
15 years, poor housing, lack of sanitation, and
inadequate dietary intake persist and explain the
continuing high incidence of infectious diseases and
the elevated infant mortality rates. Appalling living
conditions are widespread, particularly in the favelas3
around the bigger cities. In 1980 public water supplies
covered 75 per cent of the urban population, but the
percentage provided with a proper sewage disposal
system was only 55 per cent; the situation in the rural
areas is much worse.
The nutritional status of low income groups is
unsatisfactory and may worsen in the near future, due
to the current trend of income concentration. Overall
two-thirds of the economically active population earn
less than the equivalent of £ll4 monthly, (approxi-
mately two minimum wages), but this proportion
varies from 90 per cent in the Northeastern state of
Maranhâo to 48 per cent in Brasilia, the federal
capital. At present the poorest 50 per cent of the
population gets only 14.5 per cent of the national
income, while the share of the richest lOper cent is 48.5
per cent. The corresponding figures for 1960 were 17.4
per cent and 39.6 per cent respectively.
A reduction in such social inequalities over this period
would have required a different type of national
development, which would have been less favourable
to the middle and upper classes who were the major
beneficiaries of the rapid growth between 1968 and
1973. Distributive economic policies of that sort were
incompatible, however, with the political framework
created by the post-1964 regime. It was only in the late
1970s when - under the impact of the economic
recession - the living standards of the privileged
classes began to decline as well, that the social unrest
Brazilian word for shanty towns.
Li = Cr 414 at the time of writing; later in February 1983 the cruzeiro
was devalued by 30 per cent.
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arising from the critical condition of the masses led the
government to soften its socioeconomic policies.
In fact, some of the criticisms arising at this point
referred specifically to the negative health implications
of the growth strategies pursued thus far. Other
criticisms related to the unsatisfactory performance of
the so-called 'national health system', which was far
from being effective in handling the people's health
problems. A brief review of what was going wrong
with that system is thus important in reconstructing the
scene within which the disputes about PHC were to
take place.
The Health Care System
The word 'system' is used here only to designate the
complex set of public and private agencies that deal
with health care in Brazil and not at all to indicate that
they function in a rationally integrated manner.
Nevertheless, Brazil, like other Latin American
countries, has attained a reasonable level of domestic
capacity in health care. The national ratios of one
doctor and four hospital beds per 1,000 people, the
existence of 76 medical schools, and a yearly market
turnover of £1,125 mn in pharmaceuticals, illustrate
the far greater availability of health care resources
than exists in most of the developing world. This
rather special resource situation has evolved along
with two dominant characteristics in health care
provision: public funding and private production of
services.
The overall expenditure on health care in 1982 is
estimated to be £4,870 mn - £39 per head or 3.2
per cent of GDP - of which 71.5 per cent came from
public funds. INAMPS,5 the social security agency for
medical care, was responsible for 37 per cent of health
sector funds, making it the main single source of
finance. Other public sources included the federal (6.8
per cent, mainly the Ministry of Health), state (20.4
per cent) and municipal (7.3 per cent) budgets. The
major private source (16.5 per cent of sectoral
expenditure) was individual households in their
expenses on personal health care, followed by
employers' schemes (6.3 per cent), private insurance
(2.9 per cent), trade unions (2.1 per cent), and
voluntary agencies (0.7 per cent).
INAMPS' resources are allocated both to the purchase
of services from private providers and to subsidising
the services partially funded by the three levels of
government, the employers' schemes and the trade
Instituto Nacional da Assistência Médica da Previdência Social.
unions. This gives INAMPS, with its thrust towards
curative care, the capacity to influence the allocation
of most of the sectoral budget. As the Ministry of
Health and the state departments of health have faced
a chronic shortage of funds, they have increasingly
resorted to INAMPS as a source of financial help, and
public health centres have thus become deeply
engaged in curative care, to the detriment of their
original preventive aims.
With regard to the production of services, the private
sector controls 75 per cent of the almost half a million
hospital beds available in the country. One-third of
this total is scattered among small units (less than 100
beds each), which account however for 77 per cent of
the hospitals. Private services provide about a half of
the outpatient care, two-thirds of the laboratory tests,
X-rays, and specialised treatments, and 90 per cent of
the hospital care, financed by INAMPS. In 1981, 71
per cent of the latter's budget went to the private sector
in payment for medical services; the rest of the budget
was spent on services provided either by INAMPS'
own units (mainly for outpatients) or by federal, state,
and municipal hospitals and health centres.
Despite the extraordinary economic growth of the last 15 years, poor housing, lock of sanitation, and inadequate dietary intake persist in Brazil.
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Small hospitals and individual doctors (practising on
their own account or contracted by INAMPS, or often
both) constitute the most frequent forms of medical
care organisation in the private sector. Medical care
enterprises, however, have grown very rapidly since
they first appeared in' the early 1960s. They usually
care for employees of big corporations through
employer-sponsored schemes subsidised by INAMPS.
In addition to increasing their share in the health care
market, their economic dynamism has forced the
private sector as a whole to operate increasingly on
strict capitalist lines. This has created a growing
contingent of salaried professionals who - especially
in the case of the doctors - are suffering a sharp
decline in status and income relative to an earlier era of
more common liberal practice. Health workers,
particularly doctors, are thus becoming increasingly
angry about their situation, to the point where their
unions now constitute a powerful source of pressure in
favour of changing the health care system.
The poor performance of this system relative to the
health needs of the country is well known. One-third
of the population lacks regular access to health
services, which are either inadequate or are
maldistributed, socially and regionally. The services
provided are often over-sophisticated in relation to the
most frequent causes of illness and death. Curative
care takes up about 90 per cent of the sector's
expenditure, leaving insufficient resources for pre-
ventive activities.
In addition, the health services usually operate at a low
level of productivity, due to the large number of
poorly-coordinated agencies involved in health care
and the ineffectiveness of sectoral planning; many
government units are in fact underutilised. Wastage of
resources often coexists with shortages elsewhere,
such that health units are not properly equipped and
staffed. More recently, health care costs have risen
very quickly, seemingly out of control, and the social
benefit in return for each cruzeiro spent in the sector
has decreased steadily.
The search for solutions to these problems constitutes
a serious challenge to the country. First, there is the
quantitative problem of widening the system's
coverage. The mere maintenance ofthe current level of
coverage, allowing for population growth up to the
year 2000, would require an annual investment of
£1,275 mn, ie about 10 per cent of the gross capital
formation in the national economy as a whole. This is
quite apart from the investments needed to extend
services to the population not properly covered today.
It is obvious that the financing of such investments -
and the new current costs they imply - will demand,
not just a large quantity of additional funds, but also a
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much better coordination between the public and
private sectors.
Services must also be better adapted to the prevailing
health needs, both in terms of the technical inputs of
care and - still more important - of the social modes
of organising care, the sectoral productive processes'.
It is necessary to select those processes that are most
conducive to the provision of health care according to
the criteria of equity, cost-effectiveness, acceptability
and feasibility. In addition, these processes should
give the country the chance of promoting its own
capacity for innovating and controlling the techno-
logies it needs.
Health care must thus be placed under wider social
control. Most of the existing problems result from the
fact that the interests of the consumer elites, and of the
producers of health care services and goods, have
prevailed over those of the vast majority of the people.
The latter have scarcely had a say either in policy
making or in controlling the operation of the health
care sector. The present degree of political and
bureaucratic centralisation obstructs the formulation
and implementation of alternative health policies
appropriate to the different social and regional
conditions of the country. An effective decentralisation
of health care planning and management is necessary
if the health sector is to keep in line with the process of
democratisation taking place in the rest of Brazilian
society today.
Chronology of Primary Health Care in
Brazil6
Special programmes aimed at extending health
services to the rural areas were implemented in the
country for the first time during World War II. They
were conceived as being part of the conditions
necessary for the exploitation of raw materials to be
exported to the Allied Powers. The network of units
then set up has operated to the present time, run by a
branch of the Ministry of Health and devoted almost
entirely to caring for people living in remote areas and
on the country's frontiers.
State departments of health have also taken initiatives
of that sort, like the pioneering case of Piaui in the
Northeast. A network of health centres and of local,
district, and regional hospitals was established during
the late 1960s, and came to account for 90 per cent of
the hospital beds, and almost all the institutional
primary care, in the state.
From the early 1970s two different approaches to
health care extension were developed. The first, led by
This chronology is based on the work of Vieira [1978], IBRD [1979],
Guimaräes [1982], and Ministério da Saúde [1982].
agencies like the World Bank supporting integrated
rural development projects in the Northeast, consisted
of the provision of preventive care through health
auxiliaries cooperating closely with other extension
workers. In this case there was no major concern with
other levels of care. The second approach originated
within the health care sector itself and was an attempt
to spread basic health services - already existing in
the cities to the rural areas. The Ministry of Health,
INAMPS, the US Agency for International Develop-
ment, and the Pan-American Health Organisation
(PAHO), supported state health departments to
develop 'regional health systems', like those of Montes
Claros and Caruaru, in the states of Minas Gerais and
Pernambuco respectively.
Based on the experience gained from the 'regional
systems', the federal government initiated in 1976 a
large programme - PIASS7 - that was to cover all
Northeastern towns and villages of up to 20,000
people with 'statewide projects' for basic health and
sanitation services. PIASS was to incorporate the
health components of the rural development projects
being implemented throughout the region. In 1979
PIASS was turned into a national programme,
incorporating the health sectoral and extra-sectoral
activities related to PHC already taking place in other
regions of the country. Even taking this into account,
the achievements of PIASS are quite impressive. By
the early 1980s about 4,800 health posts, 4,300 health
centres, and 310 rural hospitals had been constructed
or rebuilt, and were reasonably operational. Six
hundred villages had been provided with basic systems
of water supply and nearly 80,000 households were
provided with latrines. The operation of PIASS
involved 30,000 village health workers and health
attendants, 7,800 health technicians, 13,500 doctors,
nurses and other professionals, and a £340 mn annual
budget for current costs. The programme's health
services were said to be accessible to 60 mn people,
while 1.6 mn people were covered by its water supply
and sanitation systems.
There were, however, wide variations in the quality of
the health care. While in some states all health posts
performed routine immunisations, in others few did
so. Most of the health centres offered medical care, but
only a few performed outreach work at community or
household levels. Preventive services were rarely
delivered by rural hospitals. Although an overall
evaluation has not been undertaken, there is evidence
to suggest that PIASS services were generally
unsatisfactory qualitatively, and they won little public
acceptance.
Official reports have claimed that the problems of
PtA55 resulted from the speed of its implementation,
Programa de Interioriza cao das 4çöes de Sadde e Saneamento.
which did not allow enough time for the proper
establishment of health posts and centres, the
adequate training of the staff, and the sorting out of
the funding arrangements among the health agencies
involved. At local level, politicians had distorted the
programme for electoral purposes; rural health
workers, including doctors, staffing the units were not
really committed to the objectives of PIASS; and so
on. Arguments like these became so prevalent that one
could be excused for thinking such problems might
not be aberrations but the normal outcome of a
programme like PIASS in the Brazilian context.
This attempt at a PHC-type of approach was thus only
partially successful, to the extent that it extended some
services to areas where they were not available before.
Since its sphere of operation was limited to the
periphery of the health sector, it did not influence the
definition of priorities or the pattern of resource
allocation in the sector as a whole. Equally serious was
the fact that the PHC programmes reinforced the
dominance of health professionals and the mani-
pulative practices of politicians, and very little was
achieved in terms of substantive participation by the
population.
PREVSAÚDE8: Was PIIC about to Leap
Forward?
It was in the wake of these problems experienced by
PIASS that a new programme - PREVSAUDE -
was formulated from 1979 onwards. Besides attempting
to overcome some of the limitations of PIASS in
practice, two main new objectives were set. First, basic
health services and sanitation were to be extended to
benefit the entire population, in both the rural and
urban areas. Second, the public sector - the federal,
state, and municipal health organisations - was to be
integrated to rationalise the provision of services and
to raise the productivity of the resources allocated by
government agencies to health care. The provision of
care would be regionalised. Emphasis would be given
to appropriate technology, to the wide use of general
practitioners and auxiliary personnel, and to com-
munity participation in the planning, implementation
and control of the services.
PREVSAÚDE's activities were to be organised on
three levels (see Figure 1). The primary level would be
constituted by basic care provided by health
auxiliaries, and by primary medical care in the fields of
general practice, paediatrics, gynaecology and obstet-
rics, and dentistry. This level was expected to cope
with about 80 per cent of the demand for health care,
and would be the entry to the whole health care
system. The secondary and tertiary levels would
8 Programa Nacional de Serviços Básicos de Sadde. Most of this
section is based on PRÉ VSAUDE Í1980].
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attend to patients referred to them from the primary
level, as well as dealing directly with high-risk patients
needing specialist care.
Different types of health units would take part in
PREVSAUDE's network, including health posts and
centres, outpatient clinics, and local hospitals. They
would be integratèd to allow for the referral of
patients, and the provision of technical, managerial
and supervisory support. As in the case of PIASS, it
was also suggested that the units should be linked to
each other to make up health care modules,
established in relation to defined target populations.
In quantitative terms PREVSAÚDE had very
ambitious goals. It would build or renovate a large
number of health posts, medical and dental surgeries,
rural hospitals, and emergency units, so that the
availability of these facilities would almost treble
during the 1981-86 planning period. The network
would be sufficient to provide for two outpatient visits
per head per year, and attain a satisfactory population
coverage in terms of hospital care, dental care,
nutritional aid, basic immunisation, water supply and
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sanitation, and communicable disease control. Over
300,000 health service workers were to be trained (or
retrained) and deployed. Community-based workers
were to be taught the basic principles of health care, so
they could become one of the means by which
communities could participate in the programme.
The proposed investments for PREVSAÚDE between
1981 and 1986 were estimated to be some £1,650 mn.
Operating costs over the whole development phase
were calculated at £6,900 mn and the full operating
costs after 1986 would reach £1,400 mn yearly. The
latter amount was about 30 per cent of the country's
total expenditure on health care (or about 40 per cent
of the public sector budget for health). Eighty per cent
of the total investment was to come from government
(mainly federal) funds, while external sources like the
World Bank would provide the rest in the form of
credit and grants. Current costs would be financed
exclusively from domestic sources, mainly the federal
government. Given the shortage of funds for the
current expenditures of most health authorities, the
implementation of PREVSAUDE would have required
a substantial shift in public sector resource allocation.
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PREVSAÚDE in the context of the Brazilian national health system
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The Rise and Fall of a Good Idea
PREVSAÚDE never left the drawing board. It was
conceived initially by a group of health planners in the
federal government and PAHO. Most of them had
close relations to - and much enthusiasm for - the
earlier experience of PIASS. A preliminary draft of
PREVSAUDE was put forward for the consideration
of different interest groups in the sector. This
lengthened the 'gestation period' of the proposal
which, instead of being nourished by these groups, was
purged of its more controversial aspects, and finally
aborted. Why that happened is an important question
to be answered: it is necessary to learn from past
mistakes in order to adopt better strategies in the
future. A conclusive answer would require an
investigation into many points that are still unclear, a
task that is impossible within the limits of the present
work. Instead some explanatory hypotheses with fair
degrees of plausibility are discussed.
First it should be borne in mind that, in comparison
with some radical PHC initiatives in the Third World,
PREVSAUDE was only a modernising, reforming
proposal. It is true that it had a generally redistributive
orientation and made some proposals in the areas of
food policy, housing and sanitation. Nevertheless it
was fundamentally a proposal for health care reform
and it focused exclusively on the public segment of the
sector. As far as the more crucial determinants of
health were concerned - like working conditions,
income distribution, or ultimately political partici-
pation - PREVSAUDE was especially cautious, if
not completely silent.
It would thus be incorrect to conclude that the
proposal failed because it conflicted directly with the
dominant interests in the country or even within the
health care sector itself. As mentioned earlier, Brazil
was going through a period of political 'opening up'
when the proposal appeared, and movements for
similar demands were succeeding at that time. The
regime was trying to adopt a neo-populist face, and
was searching for legitimacy and new social bases. An
expression of this was seen during the opening session
of the 7th national health conference in March 1980.
Addressing the audience in the presence of the
President and several Ministers, Halfdan Mahier, the
Director-General of WHO, pushed the Brazilian
Government into a corner by asking about its
commitment to the 10 points stated in the Alma Ata
Declaration. The government did not leave the
challenge unanswered: eloquent speeches by the
President and his Ministers reaffirmed the govern-
ment's pledge to make PHC a reality in Brazil
[Ministério da Saúde 1980].
That conference was a clear expression of support for
the ideas of PREVSAUDE, which was to be launched
a few months later. The 400 participants comprised
mainly top-ranking civil servants from federal, state
and local governments, and also university teachers,
private sector representatives, professional leaders,
and politicians. To most of the technocrats present
PREVSAUDE was appealing because it strengthened
the position of the public sector in the health care
system and thus enlarged their share of power vis-à-vis
the private sector. There were, however, good reasons
to expect resistance to PREVSAUDE by some
INAMPS professionals, as indeed transpired. Many of
them were related closely to the private sector, in
which they often held part-time appointments. Also
the integration of the government agencies in the
health sector would have undermined the sectoral
leadership that INAMPS had enjoyed thus far. So one
of the possible explanations for PREVSAUDE's
difficulties was that it became mixed up in the rivalry
among technocrats for hegemony in the health sector
[Niez 1982].
However, the main source of opposition to
PREVSAUDE came from the private providers,
although their opposition was not total, They did not
object to the programme as such, but rather to specific
components of it that might have affected the share of
the private sector in INAMPS funds. Uncertainty as to
whether additional government funding would in fact
be forthcoming led private providers to fear that
resources presently allocated to purchasing their
services would be shifted to financing the public
network of basic health services. Representatives of
the private sector thus came to criticise what they
called PREVSAUDE's 'nationalising' - or 'social-
ising' - character. Despite the more liberal political
climate prevailing at that time, labels like these were
still damaging in the Brazil of the early 1980s [O Globo
1980, Jornal de BrasIlia 1980].
Since their opposition to PREVSAÚDE was based on
specific points, private producers did not react against
the programme in a cohesive way from the beginning.
However, the planners who were pushing the proposal
did not at first perceive that lack of cohesion. By the
time they recognised that various interests were at
stake, the chance was lost for deepening the rifts
among the different groups, or for making provisional
alliances with some of them against others. This
weakness of strategy for promoting PREVSAUDE
allowed its opponents to unite and ultimately changed
the balance of forces against the proposal.
What then were the different producer interests? It is
possible to identify four main interest groups, each of
which can be sub-divided further. The first group was
the doctors who were defending, through their
powerful medical association, the AMB,9 the situation
of the semi-independent practitioners contracted by
Associaçâo Médica Brasileira.
23
INAMPS on a fee-for-services basis. These practi-
tioners rejected the programme because a greater
participation of the public sector in outpatient care
could have been financially catastrophic for them.
These doctors were still very influential, although they
were already in a minority in the profession. There was
in fact an increasing number of doctors, particularly
new graduates, who at the time were demanding jobs
that could have been given to them through
PREVSAUDE. However, the programme's supporters
did not attempt an alliance with the unemployed
doctors, perhaps because the latter were not
considered to be a group strong enough to
counterbalance the opposition of other doctors to the
proposal [Fo/ha de S. Paulo 1980].
The second interest group comprised the private
hospital owners represented by their federation, the
FBH. '° It seems unlikely that they felt any threat from
the 6,000 new beds PREVSAUDE intended to set up
in rural hospitals. It is also improbable that they were
concerned that better outpatient care might reduce the
demand for hospital care: the reverse was much more
likely to occur, namely, that the growth in ambulatory
care would bring about a substantial increase in the
number of patients referred to hospitals. Moreover,
FBH personnel were closely related to top members of
the government and they had little reason to fear that
their interests would be threatened, at least in the short
run. Yet they were apprehensive about PREVSAUDE,
and this possibly derived from the fact that the full
implementation of the programme might endanger the
growth and maintenance of the network of private
hospitals in the long term; the conditions would be
created for more radical changes to occur in the sector,
like the complete nationalisation of the health care
system [O Globo 1980].
Even among hospital owners, however, there were
grounds for different reactions to PREVSAUDE.
Owners of small local hospitals and managers of
community hospitals were less inclined to reject the
programme, in which they were to participate on a
subsidised basis; but their political strength was
insufficient to counteract the opposition from the
capitalist owners of the medium and large hospitals.
The third producer faction consisted of the group
medical enterprises that provided services for the
employers' schemes subsidised by INAMPS. These
enterprises ought not, in principle, to have feared
PREVSAUDE for at least three reasons: first, because
they cared for the employees of the big corporations,
the elite of the Brazilian working class, who were to be
among the last groups to be covered by the
programme; second, because they themselves were
trying to rationalise health care in a manner quite
W Federaçto Brasileira de Hospdais
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similar to that sponsored by the proposal; and third,
because PREVSAUDE could have weakened the
market position of the private doctors and hospitals,
thus creating new opportunities for the enterprises to
expand their share of the medical care market.
However, they also had reasons for being unenthu-
siastic about a programme that could come to mean a
virtual government monopoly of outpatient care.
ABRAMGE," the enterprises' representative organi-
sation, argued this possibility at the time. Another
circumstance may, also have led ABRAMGE to
oppose PREVSAUDE. Young doctors who were
supporting the proposal in the medical union
movement were often employees of the medical
enterprises, and in the course of labour disputes they
would voice opinions in favour of nationalisation, an
association of political views that could have hardened
the attitude of the medical enterprises against
PREVSAUDE [Visão 1980].
The last interest group involved the producers of drugs
and of medical equipment and supplies. What
mattered to them was growth of sales, be this through
the state system or the private sector. Even if the
government had intended to take over the health care
sector, it would only have affected the production of
health services and not that of supplies (though
PREVSAUDE did state some policy principles
regarding pharmaceuticals). Thus this producer group
did not take sides in the PREVSAUDE controversy.
Although PREVSAÚDE was nothing more than a
logical development of PIASS, it could be argued that
its failure was due, at least partly, to its over-ambitious
objectives in the Brazilian context. Thus at the time
PREVSAUDE was proposed, there was no active
public or political interest in such a programme. The
attitudes of the health care authorities and institutions,
and the balance of power in the sector, were such as to
create an environment that was hostile to the thrust of
the programme.
Nevertheless, there was also a failure of political
strategy. Despite the non-conducive atmosphere of
the health arena, the proposal never managed to break
out of that sector to involve other social groups in the
discussion. The latter took place only in specialist
health circles and there was no attempt to mobilise
precisely those whom the programme was expected to
benefit, the poorer strata of the population. Ironically,
the proposal in favour of popular participation in
health was managed in a notably non-participatory
way [Estado de Minas 1980], and neither the
population nor their representative organisations
recognised it as something that they should support
actively.
Associaçâo Brasileira de Medicina de Grupo.
In this connection it is worth mentioning that, during
the first national conference of the labour movement
in 1981 - after the hard political years of the 1970s
- the trade unionists attending agreed that a crucial
question for them was the social control of health care.
Yet while they criticised the private sector, they
rejected the idea of nationalisation until such time as
they had been granted the right to participate in health
policy making [Comissâo Nacional Pró-Cut 19811.
The lessons of such an attitude were not grasped by the
promoters of PREVSAUDE, and the wider social
support that might have counterbalanced the sectoral
opposition to the programme never materialised.
It would be wrong to state that none of PREVSAÚDE's
proposals has been put into practice; some of them
have been implemented in the process of INAMPS
trying to rationalise its own health care provision. In
the meantime the PIASS network continues to
function, not without its usual problems. And the
same crisis situation of the Brazilian health care
system persists, sometimes more, sometimes less,
acutely. It is doubtful if radical changes can be
postponed indefinitely [CONASP 19821.12
PREVSAÚDE: Was it only a Failure or also a
Rich Learning Experience?
From the standpoint of practical achievement,
PREVSAUDE was a complete failure. However, a
whole generation of Brazilian health planners -
senior and junior - has had the chance to learn two
important, related lessons from the experience.
The first is, once again, the necessity to put health in its
proper multisectoral perspective, which is so much
wider than the narrow framework of the health care
sector that has dominated the discussion in the
country so far. Many health care professionals - even
well meaning ones - have fallen into the trap of
'medicalising' health, which masks the continuing
socioeconomic determinants of health and disease;
and they have thereby contributed to brainwashing
the population into believing that health care is a
sufficient condition for achieving health. In future
health policy must not be limited to health care
organisation, which is only one focus of the former. It
must be clarified how, and to what extent, the
socioeconomic determinants of illness will be dealt
with in the social and economic spheres. Health care
services will then appear as just one of the measures
that must be adopted to promote, protect and restore
health.
It may be difficult for those who earn their living by
dispensing medical care to accept such an argument,
but a critical evaluation of the limits and scope of
O Conselho Consultivo da Adminstraçao da Saúde Previdenciária.
health care is absolutely essential. Countries that have
managed to undertake radical changes in their health
systems have often done so without the help of their
health care professionals, if not actually in face of their
opposition.
At the same time it must be recognised that society as a
whole has not yet adopted this sort of critical thinking;
it remains fixated on the traditional myths about
medicine and health. A critical view of the limits of
health care technology has been gaining ground only
recently, and has arisen - paradoxically - from
within medicine itself. Broadening the perspective of
the health sector should thus be a social process rather
than a technocratic exercise or a corporate institutional
arrangement, and society must develop its own critical
faculty in relation to health questions. Promoting
popular evaluation of health problems and policies
may well become a new important field of work for
professionals who want to break away from the
constraints of conventional medical analyses.
Following, this point, the second lesson from the
PREVSAUDE experience relates to the process by
which reform will take place in the health sector. The
fate of the proposal seems to have put an end to the
idea that drawing up a rational blueprint is a sufficient
means for changing the face of reality. Planning can
only have limited power to solve the problems of the
provision of health services and the organisation of the
health sector. This is even more the case when the
planning does not take into account the economic and
political interests that are at stake in the health care
arena, and idealises what is likely to be achieved by
state intervention in a situation such as that prevailing
in Brazil.
PREVSAÚDE completely failed to come to grips with
the politics of health and health care. It succumbed to
the technocratic temptation to try to change reality in
a voluntaristic and messianic way, and it attempted
unwittingly - to substitute for those popular forces
that are so much more capable of waging an effective
struggle for social change. Because the programme
was not submitted for wider social scrutiny and
support, PREVSAUDE was never validated by the
political forces that could have translated the proposal
into a reality.
The health situation in Brazil has reached a point
where technique alone can contribute little towards
finding solutions to the crucial questions that are still
unresolved. The recognition of this fact, and the
democratisation of the health debate, must be top
priorities if society is to exercise control over the
causes of its health problems and over the health care
system.
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